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“Speaking Out of the Most
Passionate Love” – James Baldwin
and Pragmatism
Ulf Schulenberg
1 As a method, (conceptual) instrument, or form of redescription, pragmatism has been
severely criticized since its inception in the late-nineteenth century. It has been attacked
for  supporting  American  imperialism  (James),  for  being  depressingly  anemic  and
ultimately utterly ineffectual (Dewey), or for being unbearably frivolous, decadent, and
cynical  (Rorty).  Nowadays,  however,  it  seems  that  pragmatism’s  fate  has  changed
decidedly. The much-debated revival or renaissance of pragmatism, for which Rorty has
prepared the ground since the 1970’s, has demonstrated the multilayered complexity of
this way of thinking and of grasping the relation between theory and practice. In view of
pragmatism’s  undeniable  success  in  various  fields,  from  literary  studies  to  law  (see
Dickstein),  the  question  inevitably  arises:  Why  pragmatism?  To  put  this  somewhat
differently, one wonders what exactly pragmatism has to offer. What is pragmatism good
for? One answer is certainly that this way of thinking offers a possibility of bringing it all
together,  as  it  were:  antifoundationalism,  antiessentialism,  nominalism,  historicism,
fallibilism and antiskepticism, meliorism, and an antitheoretical stance which at the same
time ought to be seen as a resistance to the general resistance to theory.  Whereas a
materialist  theoretician  such  as  Fredric  Jameson,  for  instance,  has  always  put  an
emphasis  on  the  utmost  importance  of  the  conceptual  instrument  of  mediation,
pragmatism, in its antisystematicity and governed by an anti-Hegelian gesture, seeks to
make clear that one does not need any of these old-fashioned instruments in order to
recognize the intimate interwovenness of pragmatic (anti-)theory and liberal pluralism.
2 Yet it is not only Hegelian Marxism and Marxist literary and aesthetic theory which are
no longer of any use, if one follows most neopragmatists, but also poststructuralist and
deconstructive approaches. Concerning the relationship between pragmatism, Marxism,
and poststructuralism, Morris Dickstein underlines that “pragmatism has come to be seen
as an American alternative, an escape from the abstraction of theory [Marxism] and the
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abyss of nihilism [poststructuralism]” (Dickstein 16). Giles Gunn contends that “over the
next decade or two pragmatism may well prove to be the most intellectually resilient
American response to the quicksands and carapaces of cultural postmodernism” (Gunn 7).
3 Dickstein  and  Gunn  seem  to  maintain  that  pragmatism  as  a  theoretical  practice
strengthens our position in the confrontation with other theoretical approaches. Not only
is  pragmatism a  philosophy which critiques  abstractions  and absolutes  and which is
clearly oriented toward practice and action, but it also helps and guides us in our search
for method.  Following Dickstein,  pragmatism in its  contemporary version “is  less  an
attack on the foundations of knowledge, as it was portrayed by its early critics, than a
search for method when the foundations have already crumbled” (Dickstein 16).  It  is
crucial to see that Stanley Fish would object to this that it comes close to another version
of antifoundationalist theory hope. What we finally have to understand, in other words, is
that  pragmatism does  not  offer  anything  to  us,  not  even a  method.  Concerning  his
interpretation of  pragmatism,  his  essay with the somewhat  unusual  title  “Truth and
Toilets” is surely the most valuable text. In this piece, originally the afterword to the
volume edited by Dickstein, Fish makes clear that 
pragmatism  should  itself  know  enough  not  to  promise  anything,  or  even  to
recommend anything. If pragmatism is true, it has nothing to say to us; no politics
follows from it or is blocked by it; no morality attaches to it or is enjoined by it
(Fish 295). 
4 In Fish’s account, pragmatism has no firm outline, and this vagueness or amorphousness
has two advantages. First, a way of thinking so protean is a bad target for its enemies
because they do not know what to hit and where to attack it.  Second, because of its
vagueness, pragmatism is incapable of serving as a successor theory, a new foundation, to
the foundationalist theories whose shortcomings and inadequacies it has illuminated. One
of  the  most  interesting  aspects  of  this  text  is  that  one  could  almost  speak  of  a
disappearance of pragmatism with regard to Fish’s depiction of it: “Pragmatism may be
the one theory – if it is a theory – that clears the field not only of its rivals but of itself, at
least  as  a  positive  alternative”  (Fish  299).  Discussing  essays  by  Richard  J. Bernstein,
Richard  Poirier,  and James  T.  Kloppenberg,  Fish  stresses  that  “nothing  follows  from
pragmatism, not democracy, not a love of poetry, not a mode of doing history” (Fish 304).
In view of the fact that pragmatism delivers no method, the question arises as to what it
can be good for. 
5 The answer to this question, if one follows Fish, consists of two parts. First, pragmatism
teaches us that all we need can be found in the world of practices (and it thus shows us
that  we already have everything we need due to our embeddedness in local  specific
situations). Second, pragmatism teaches us that we live in a rhetorical world. As regards
the first point, Fish’s stripped-down version of pragmatism emphasizes the sufficiency of
human practices, as well as the idea that this way of thinking, despite the fact that it
delivers no method,  assures us “that in ordinary circumstances there will  usually be
something to be done” (Fish 307). Pragmatism as an (anti-)philosophy of little steps, of
small patchwork solutions, temporary stopgaps, and creative and experimental tinkering
inevitably leads us back to the solidity and plasticity of the world which is shaped and
constantly reshaped (or redescribed) by human beings. The way we are in this world of
practice  is  utterly  independent  of  the  theoretical  account  we  sometimes,  in  certain
situations, give of those practices. Our theoretical narratives or vocabularies will never
have the desired consequences in the world of practice. In the confrontation with the
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solidity of  this world of  practice,  and solidity here paradoxically means contingency,
transcience, and history, theory can only be considered a large blurry fantasy.
6 Whereas Fish would answer the aforementioned question “Why pragmatism?” by calling
attention  to  pragmatism’s  disappearance  as  a  positive  alternative  or  method,  Mark
Bauerlein, in The Pragmatic Mind, argues that (Rortyan) pragmatism should be regarded
as “a justification for making criticism into an instrument for social reform” (Bauerlein
xi). Bauerlein speaks of an “appealing political impulse of the new pragmatism,” and he
avers that while Nietzschean, Foucauldian, and de Manian forms of antifoundationalism,
antirealism, and antirepresentation-alism inevitably lead to “a nihilistic assertion of the
loss of transcendence,” neopragmatism “interprets antirepresentationalism as the happy
fore-ground  of  a  reconstruction  of  culture  and  criticism”  (Bauerlein  xv).  Although
Bauerlein ignores the political  side of deconstruction,  which has become increasingly
obvious in the last two decades (think of the questions of deconstruction and ethics,
deconstruction and law, and deconstruction and Marxism), his emphasis on the political
impulses of neopragmatism is particularly valuable. This article wants to contribute to a
discussion of those political impulses by concentrating on the question of pragmatism
and race. Since the 1980’s, the question of the color of pragmatism has slowly but steadily
gained in importance (see, for example, Hutchinson, Lawson and Koch, and Posnock). In
order to elucidate one possibility of approaching this complex question, I wish to discuss
James Baldwin’s essays. It is argued that his essays can be used to show the significance of
a middle ground between Cornel West’s prophetic pragmatism, as a political endeavor
radically criticizing late capitalism, and Richard Rorty’s liberal version of neopragmatism.
Baldwin was of course not a pragmatist in the full sense of the word, yet there are many
elements of his thought which make it seem legitimate to state that, at least to a certain
degree, he is part of a genealogy of black pragmatism that reaches from W.E.B. Du Bois
and Alain Locke to West. 
7 Concerning Baldwin’s position between West and Rorty, one can formulate this as follows:
Instead of a political radicalism that aims at revolutionary praxis, as developed by West in
the late 1970’s and 1980’s, Baldwin favors a moralism that offers the individual room for
creative forms of self-renewal. In the early 1970’s, however, Baldwin briefly did present
himself as a socialist radical. Whereas a Rortyan liberal scenario insinuates that there is
no  necessity  to  radically  change  the  status  quo  and  thus  directs  attention  to  the
advantages  of  a  literary  or  poeticized  culture  offering  the  possibility  of  constantly
developing new forms of self-creation and new redescriptions, Baldwin urges his readers
to realize that political and cultural change is unavoidable and urgently needed in order
to achieve black freedom and a genuinely humane society. In other words, in Baldwin’s
essays, moral commitment, the notion of political change, and the idea of self-creation
are combined in a way that indirectly critiques leftist radical politics, on the one hand,
and nonchalant liberal gestures of self-transformation and self-renewal, on the other.
Moreover,  a  discussion  of  Baldwin’s  essays  can  be  useful  in  order  to  illustrate  the
productive tension between what might be termed the worldliness of pragmatism, on the
one hand, and the creative and innovative work of the strong poet who strives to prepare
the establishment of a postmetaphysical literary or poeticized culture, on the other. 
1. Cornel West’s Prophetic and Worldly Pragmatism
8 The story Cornel  West  tells  in The American  Evasion  of  Philosophy:  A  Genealogy  of
Pragmatism (1989) is one with a host of characters. It is a complicated and fragmented
narrative, full of partly unexpected twists and turns. West knows how to tell a good story,
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and he therefore knows that the beginning of a story is of utmost importance. He does
not begin with the usual suspects, that is, James, Peirce, and Dewey, but instead tries to
elucidate the prehistory of  American pragmatism by discussing Emerson.  While he is
certainly not the only one who sees Emerson as belonging to the prehistory of American
pragmatism - others would, for instance, suggest that one ought to consider Whitman as
the  main  precursor  of  pragmatism  -  his  argumentation  to  support  this  idea seems
particularly  convincing.  His  genealogy  of  pragmatism reaches  from Emerson,  James,
Peirce,  and  Dewey  through  Sidney  Hook,  C.  Wright  Mills,  W.E.B.  Du  Bois,  Reinhold
Niebuhr, and Lionel Trilling to W.V. Quine and Richard Rorty.
9 West closes his book with an explication of his notion of prophetic pragmatism. Not only
does he underline the renewed importance of pragmatism in the late 1980’s, but he also
contends that, in a time designated by many as postmodern, pragmatism might again
appear  attractive  because of  “its  unashamedly moral  emphasis  and its  unequivocally
ameliorative impulse.” Further, pragmatism might turn out to be capable of satisfying “a
yearning  for  principled  resistance  and  struggle”  (West,  The  American  Evasion  of
Philosophy 4). Throughout his text, West directs his readers’ attention to the productive
tension between pragmatism’s insights and blindnesses, its obvious strengths and its no
less obvious weaknesses. Although West realizes the plurality of possible pragmatisms, he
maintains that this heterogeneity must not prevent one from seeing that pragmatism
always aims at expanding (creative) democracy and enriching individuality. He interprets
pragmatism as a future-oriented instrumental-ism which uses thought as a weapon for
more effective action and vocabularies as tools for coping with the world.
10 In  order  to  fully  understand the  Westian notion of  pragmatism as  a  future-oriented
instrumentalism, one should keep in mind the broader context of discussion, a context
which is of special interest to (New) Americanists. In the last three decades, approaches
such as (New) American Studies, feminist studies, feminist legal studies, queer theory,
postcolonial studies, and critical race theory, to name but a few, have drawn attention to
the interrelation of theory and practice, that is, they have vehemently underscored that
theory ought to be seen as critical practice. To a certain degree, they argue, practice
needs (provisional, tentative, and heuristic) theoretical foundations, yet at the same time
theory is dependent on practice. Theorist-activists have made it sufficiently clear that
political practice, that is, situatedness, contextuality, historicity, and contingency, shapes
our theory. In other words, theoretical work is viewed as contributing to social change, it
has consequences in the practical world, the messy world of everyday life, and political
activism  is  seen  as  shaping  our  theories.  It  is  important  to  grasp  that,  while  a
sophisticated leftist version of neopragmatism has to problematize some of these ideas, it
contends that the point of theorizing is to contribute to social change, it wants theory to
have consequences in history. 
11 In  his  introduction  to  The  American  Evasion  of  Philosophy,  West stresses  the
Americanness of pragmatism when he writes: 
I understand American pragmatism as a specific historical and cultural product of
American  civilization,  a  particular  set  of  social  practices  that  articulate  certain
American desires,  values,  and responses and that are elaborated in institutional
apparatuses  principally  controlled by a  significant  slice  of  the American middle
class (West, The American Evasion of Philosophy 4-5).
12 In West’s account, the American evasion of philosophy - that is, the pragmatists’ radical
critique and evasion of epistemology-centered philosophy - has led to a profound change
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in  the  conception of  philosophy.  Because  of  this  evasion,  philosophy has  slowly  but
steadily turned into a kind of  cultural  criticism in which the meaning of  America is
continually  questioned  and  debated.  What  this  means  is  that  this  swerve  from
epistemology or abstract pure philosophy in general has led not to a radical dismissal of
philosophy but to its reconception as a form of cultural criticism which is politically
engaged and which,  at  least  in  its  Westian version,  can be  understood as  a  kind of
American leftist critique. As West puts it, 
[i]n  this  sense,  American  pragmatism  is  less  a  philosophical  tradition  putting
forward solutions to perennial problems in the Western philosophical conversation
initiated  by  Plato  and  more  a  continuous  cultural  commentary  or  set  of
interpretations that attempt to explain America to itself at a particular historical
moment (West, The American Evasion of Philosophy 5).
13 By emphasizing the political and moral aspects of American pragmatism, West shows that
he regards his genealogical account as an explicitly political endeavor. This signifies that
his  cultural  commentary  wants  to  explain  America  to  itself  from a  decidedly  leftist
vantage point.  His  version of  a  worldly pragmatism is  supposed to resuscitate leftist
politics in the U.S. West offers an admittedly idiosyncratic interpretation of one of the
major  progressive  traditions  in  the U.S.,  and by doing so  he not  only  addresses  the
profound crisis of the 1980’s American Left, but he also hopes to “inspire and instruct
contemporary efforts to remake and reform American society and culture” (West, The
American Evasion of Philosophy 7). His gesture of hope and resistance insists on the fact
that pragmatism should be considered an indigenous and rich source of leftist politics in
the U.S., and this leads to his suggestion that his conception of prophetic pragmatism 
serves  as  the  culmination  of  the  American  pragmatist  tradition;  that  is,  it  is  a
perspective and project that speaks to the major impediments to a wider role of
pragmatism in American thought (West, The American Evasion of Philosophy 7). 
14 This is certainly not a modest proposal, but one ought to note that pragmatist ideas were
already  central  to  Prophesy  Deliverance!.  West’s  preoccupation  with  pragmatism
therefore has a longer history. While the primary concern of Prophesy Deliverance! was
the  establishment  of  a  fruitful  dialogue  between  black  liberation  theology  and
progressive  Marxism,  it  was  also  informed  by  pragmatism’s  notions  of  historicism,
antifoundationalism, and fallibilism. Pragmatism, as West put it, “provides an American
context for Afro-American thought […]” (West, Prophesy Deliverance! 21).
15 Following West, getting rid of all the misjudgments, myths, distortions, and stereotypes
surrounding pragmatism would finally enable us to grasp that this way of thinking can be
seen “as a component of a new and novel form of indigenous American oppositional
thought and action […]” (West, The American Evasion of Philosophy 8). It is precisely the
development of such an oppositional American cultural criticism that West sees as his
task in The American Evasion of Philosophy and other texts. 
16 Like Deweyan pragmatism, West’s conception of prophetic pragmatism can be considered
a continuation, and a creative revision, of Emerson’s evasion of epistemology-centered
philosophy. In a Deweyan manner, the radical historicist and fallibilist West rejects a
spectator theory of knowledge, the quest for certainty, and the search for immutable
foundations, and he attempts to contribute to the promotion of an Emersonian culture of
creative democracy. It is important to note, however, that West’s neopragmatism strives
to go beyond the tradition of pragmatism, that is, it builds on the tradition which reaches
from Emerson to Rorty and, at the same time, it radicalizes it.  Combining insights of
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theorists as varied as Emerson, James, Dewey, Du Bois, Hook, Mills, Niebuhr, and Trilling,
West’s contention is that his prophetic pragmatism makes the “political motivation and
political substance of the American evasion of philosophy explicit” (West, The American
Evasion of Philosophy 213). Four main characteristics of West’s prophetic and worldly
pragmatism should be  mentioned.  First,  it  is  a  form of  cultural  and social  criticism.
Second,  it  sees  itself  as  part  of  an  emancipatory  leftist  political  project  and  as  an
emancipatory social experimentalism. Third, it is religiously inspired, that is, strongly
influenced by the Christian tradition and by black liberation theology. Hence, it has a
mediating function between Protestant Christianity and leftist romanticism. Finally, it
presents itself as a form of tragic thought. Since his early texts, West’s blues sensibility
has been a crucial aspect of his thinking, that is, he, firmly rooted in the tradition of black
liberation theology and its  understanding of  suffering,  pain,  resistance,  and struggle,
emphasizes that there are always hope and the possibility of human (collective) agency in
the confrontation with the tragic. As a form of “third-wave left romanticism,” West’s
prophetic pragmatism “tempers its utopian impulse with a profound sense of the tragic
character of life and history” (West, The American Evasion of Philosophy 228).
17 However, it does not succumb to this tragic character,  but rather presents itself as a
philosophy  of  struggle,  a  philosophy  of  praxis  –  a  cultural  criticism  that  draws  its
strength  from  an  American  and  African  American  tradition  of  leftist  resistance.  As
regards the notion of struggle, West points out: “Human struggle sits at the center of
prophetic  pragmatism,  a  struggle  guided  by  a  democratic  and  libertarian  vision,
sustained by moral courage and existential integrity, and tempered by the recognition of
human finitude and frailty” (West, The American Evasion of Philosophy 229). As far as the
utopian and revolutionary  gestures  underlying  prophetic  pragmatism are  concerned,
West maintains: “It calls for utopian energies and tragic actions, energies and actions that
yield permanent and perennial revolutionary, rebellious, and reformist strategies that
oppose the status quos of our day” (West, The American Evasion of Philosophy 229). West
drives  his  point  home  when  he  concisely  explicates  that  “the  praxis  of  prophetic
pragmatism is tragic action with revolutionary intent, usually reformist consequences,
and always  visionary  outlook”  (West,  The  American  Evasion  of  Philosophy 229).  The
vehemence and intensity of West’s sentences remind one of his most radical book to date,
Prophesy  Deliverance!.  Although  he  speaks  of  ‘reformist  consequences’  in  the  last
quotation, these passages unequivocally indicate that pragmatism and liberalism do not
necessarily have to go hand in hand,  that  they do not  always have to be intimately
interwoven. What we read here are not the words of a nonchalant bourgeois pragmatist
who tries to rhetorically convince us that we had better refrain from wanting anything
other  than  a  late-capitalist  liberal  bourgeois  society.  Rather,  it  becomes  repeatedly
obvious  in  his  text  that  West  intends  to  build  leftist  coalitions  that  involve  various
oppositional social movements ranging from racial, ethnic, religious, class, and gender to
gay and lesbian movements.
18 In The American Evasion of Philosophy, West Americanizes leftist theory and practice; he
seeks “to accent the specificity of American left possibilities” (West 2001: 358). Prophetic
pragmatism, as West makes clear, considers itself the culmination of the major American
progressive tradition of cultural criticism, and it is shaped by the American intellectual
and political situation of the 1980s. Relating prophetic pragmatism’s American roots and
the question of postmodern difference, West writes: 
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Prophetic pragmatism arrives on the scene as a particular American intervention
conscious  and  critical  of  its  roots,  and  radically  historical  and  political  in  its
outlook.  Furthermore,  it  gives  prominence  to  the  plight  of  those  peoples  who
embody  and  enact  the  “postmodern”  themes  of  degraded  otherness,  subjected
alienness,  and  subaltern  marginality,  that  is,  the  wretched  of  the  earth  (poor
peoples of color, women, workers). (West, The American Evasion of Philosophy 237)
Prophetic  pragmatism,  as  mentioned  above,  wants  to  contribute  to  the
resuscitation  of  Left  politics  in  the  U.S.,  and it  tries  to  function  as  a  means of
empowering  formerly  marginalized  voices  in  postmodern  times.  Clearly,  it  is
strongly influenced by European traveling theories such as Marxism, structuralism,
discourse analysis, and to a certain extent poststructural-ism, but “it remains in the
American grain” (West, The American Evasion of Philosophy 239).
2. Richard Rorty and the Idea of a Literary or Poeticized Culture
19 At  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century,  European  linguistic  practices  changed  at  an
enormously fast rate, and redescriptions became ever more radical in nature. The poet, in
the broad sense of someone who wants to make it new, the maker of new words or the
shaper of new and exciting languages, contributed to this acceleration of cultural change
to a remarkable degree.  Strong poets,  in the sense of people who constantly long to
redescribe many things in new ways, who use words as they have never been used before,
and who desire to expand the power of the human imagination, make us realize the
importance of self-creation, self-fashioning and redescription in a literary or poeticized
culture.  The  strong  poet  as  the  creator  of  a  new  vocabulary  can  be  P.B.  Shelley
elaborating on the power of the “unacknowledged legislators of the World” (A Defence of
Poetry), or Hegel moving at the limits of syntax and letting us realize that it is perfectly
legitimate  to  advance  the  argument  that  sublation  is  but  a  form  of  innovative
redescription.
20 Redescriptions  offered  by  strong  poets  such  as,  for  instance,  Shelley,  Coleridge,
Wordsworth, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Proust, Joyce, and Adorno will provoke other
people to change the way they speak, and it is this change of language that will eventually
contribute to a profound cultural change. The idea of a literary or poeticized culture and
the notion of the power of redescription are two provocative aspects of Richard Rorty’s
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989). Following Rorty, his liberal utopia would be a
poeticized culture. The beginnings of this kind of culture can be detected at the end of the
eighteenth century with the emergence of new vocabularies, but it has not yet been fully
realized.  A  liberal  poeticized  culture  in  its  fully  realized  form  would  be
antifoundationalist,  antiessentialist,  nominalist,  fallible,  and  historicist  through  and
through. Such a poeticized culture urges us to grasp that only strong poets and Rortyan
liberal ironists fully recognize the importance of contingency and the power of radical
redescription,  and  that  we  should  therefore  strive  to  imitate  the  strong  poet’s
Nietzschean self-knowledge as self-creation.
21 The  idea  of  a  post-Philosophical  culture  has  preoccupied  Richard  Rorty  since  his
introduction to The Linguistic Turn (1967). It was central to many of the essays collected
in Consequences of Pragmatism (1982), and it played a decisive role in the last chapter
(“Philosophy Without Mirrors”) of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979). In its most
fully developed form, the idea of a post-Philosophical culture as poeticized culture is one
of the primary aspects of Rorty’s Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. In all of these texts,
Rorty underscores that he has no use for a traditional understanding of philosophy. In his
opinion, 
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[i]nteresting philosophy is rarely an examination of the pros and cons of a thesis.
Usually it is, implicitly or explicitly, a contest between an entrenched vocabulary
which has become a nuisance and a half-formed new vocabulary which vaguely
promises great things (Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity 9). 
22 He describes his own way of doing philosophy when he summarizes the new method as
follows: 
The method is to redescribe lots and lots of things in new ways, until you have
created a pattern of linguistic behavior which will tempt the rising generation to
adopt it, thereby causing them to look for appropriate new forms of nonlinguistic
behavior,  for  example,  the  adoption  of  new  scientific  equipment  or  new  social
institutions (Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity 9). 
23 The  radical antifoundationalist  and  anti-Platonist  Rorty  redescribes  the  notion  of
philosophy as a foundational discipline, and this redescription directs attention to the
idea of a postmetaphysical literary culture. Rorty’s antifoundationalism should be seen as
an important part of the attempt to de-divinize the world. We should no longer rely on
and believe in foundations, we should no longer worship anything, we should face the
consequences of secularization, and we should finally realize that our self, our language,
and our community are governed by contingency. Rorty’s ideal liberal democracy, and
culture, would no longer need any foundations, 
it would be one which was enlightened, secular, through and through. It would be
one in which no trace of divinity remained, either in the form of a divinized world
or a divinized self. Such a culture would have no room for the notion that there are
nonhuman  forces  to  which  human  beings  should  be  responsible  (Rorty,
Contingency, Irony and Solidarity 45). 
24 In his description of  his ideal  poeticized culture, most of  the crucial  elements of  his
neopragmatist  thinking  come  together:  his  antifoundationalism and  antiessentialism,
Davidsonian  and  Wittgensteinian  nominalism,  Hegelian  historicism,  Darwinian
naturalism, Nietzschean and Proustian perspectivism, as well as his Freudian conception
of the human self (see Schulenberg, “Wanting Lovers Rather than Knowers”).
25 In one of his latest pieces, “Philosophy as a Transitional Genre,” Rorty states a thesis
which he has been repeating since the 1970’s: 
It  is  that  the  intellectuals  of  the  West  have,  since  the  Renaissance,  progressed
through three stages: they have hoped for redemption first from God, then from
philosophy, and now from literature (Rorty, “Philosophy as a Transitional Genre”
8).
26 According to Rorty, we live in a (not fully realized) literary culture. The transition from a
philosophical to a literary culture began with Hegel. It was with Hegel that philosophy
reached its most ambitious and presumptuous form, which almost instantly turned into
its dialectical opposite; that is, the Hegelian system eventually turned out to be a kind of
utterly unironical,  self-consuming artefact. Hegel’s system was serious in its desire to
depict things as they really were and it sought to fit everything into a single context. This
also signifies, of course, that it pretended to represent the totality. Rorty contends: 
Since  Hegel’s  time,  the  intellectuals  have  been  losing  faith  in  philosophy.  This
amounts to losing faith in the idea that redemption can come in the form of true
beliefs. In the literary culture that has been emerging during the last two hundred
years, the question ‘Is it true?’ has yielded to the question ‘What’s new?’ (Rorty,
“Philosophy as a Transitional Genre” 9). 
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27 In today’s literary culture, philosophy and religion have become marginal, they appear as
only optional literary genres. A literary culture still offers the possibility of redemption,
but the kind of redemption has changed. Thus Rorty points out: 
As  I  am using  the  terms  “literature”  and  “literary  culture,”  a  culture  that  has
substituted literature for both religion and philosophy finds redemption neither in
a  noncognitive  relation  to  a  nonhuman  person  nor  in  a  cognitive  relation  to
propositions,  but  in  noncognitive  relations  to  other  human  beings,  relations
mediated by human artifacts  such as  books  and buildings,  paintings  and songs.
These  artifacts  provide  a  sense  of  alternative  ways  of  being  human  (  Rorty,
“Philosophy as a Transitional Genre” 10).
28 What this also means is that the search for God was replaced by the striving for Truth,
and  that  the  latter  has  finally  been  replaced  by  the  search  for  novelty  and  by  the
recognition that redemption can only be found in human creations and artifacts and not
in the escape from the temporal to the eternal or transcendental.
29 How does Rorty define the members of a literary culture, the literary intellectuals? His
understanding  of  the  function  of  the  literary  intellectual  combines  a  Bloomian
interpretation  of  the  autonomy  of  the  self  with  Emersonian  self-reliance.  A  literary
intellectual has constant doubts about the (final) vocabulary she is currently using, she
does not want to get stuck in it.  She longs to become acquainted with other ways of
speaking, other ways of interpreting the purpose of life. For that reason she reads as
many books as possible. By becoming acquainted with so many alternative vocabularies
and ways  of  being human,  the  literary  intellectual  enlarges  her  self.  Because  of  her
reading,  she  is  introduced  to  a  great  number  of  alternative  purposes,  and  ways  of
expressing those purposes, and she is thus given the possibility of radically questioning
traditional  vocabularies  and explanations.  To put  it  simply,  the literary intellectual’s
reading leads to her self-creation, it offers her the possibility of creating an autonomous
self. Rorty apparently agrees with Harold Bloom that the more books you have read, the
more descriptions and redescriptions you have come across, the more human and at the
same time autonomous you become. A Rortyan and Bloomian autonomous self puts a
premium  on  the  attempt  to  creatively  expand  the  present  limits  of  the  human
imagination, and it also seeks to demonstrate that the development from religion (God) to
philosophy  (Truth)  to  literature  (novelty,  imagination,  redescription)  is  a  story  of
increasing self-reliance.
30 In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty explains the relation between redescription
and self-creation as follows: 
We redescribe ourselves, our situation, our past, in those terms and compare the
results  with alternative redescriptions which use the vocabularies of  alternative
figures. We ironists hope, by this continual redescription, to make the best selves
for ourselves that we can (Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity 80). 
31 However, redescription does not only work on the personal level. Rorty has repeatedly
emphasized that, instead of a set of foundations, liberal culture needs an improved self-
description. He comments on the task of redescribing liberalism thus: 
We need a redescription of liberalism as the hope that culture as a whole can be
‘poeticized’ rather than as the Enlightenment hope that it can be ‘rationalized’ or
‘scientized.’ That is, we need to substitute the hope that chances for fulfillment of
idiosyncratic fantasies will  be equalized for the hope that everyone will  replace
‘passion’ or fantasy with ‘reason’ (Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity 53).
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32 It is crucial to understand that, in a poeticized culture, literary criticism is the presiding
intellectual discipline. Liberal ironists think of literary critics as moral advisers because
the  latter  have  read  many  books  and  are  therefore  acquainted  with  many  different
vocabularies. Moreover, literary critics can offer new perspectives, since they are often
capable of bringing together books and authors which have hitherto been considered as
incompatible.  The critics’  syntheses of,  for instance,  Nietzsche and Mill  or Marx and
Baudelaire or Sartre and Proust are examples of the power of creative redescriptions. Yet
Rorty’s contention is that the idea of ironist literary intellectuals governing a liberal
poeticized culture and engaging in literary criticism in the broadest  sense has to be
problematized insofar as there is still a gap between those intellectuals and the public.
They belong to a kind of avant-garde because they have the leisure and the money to
spend most of their time reading books and redescribing persons and things. It is their
job to convince the public, which consists mostly of metaphysicians, of the advantages of
a nominalist and historicist literary culture. Rorty writes: 
The  rise  of  literary  criticism  to  preeminence within  the  high  culture  of  the
democracies – its gradual and only semiconscious assumption of the cultural role
once claimed (successively) by religion, science, and philosophy – has paralleled the
rise in the proportion of ironists to metaphysicians among the intellectuals. This
has widened the gap between the intellectuals and the public. For metaphysics is
woven  into  the  public  rhetoric  of  modern  liberal  societies  (Rorty, Contingency,
Irony and Solidarity 82).
33 The story I have been telling so far is one of increasing self-reliance, that is,  it is an
Emersonian story about the strong poet’s desire for self-creation in a liberal poeticized
culture. However, one ought to see that this is not only a story that centers on self-
reliance and self-creation but also on fear. One might even say that it begins with fear.
Rorty apparently follows Bloom in arguing that poetry begins in fear. The profound fear
of the poet is  to wake up one day and find himself  in a world he has not made,  an
inherited world. To put it another way, the poet fears to end his days in a world to which
he has contributed nothing of distinction and which he has not creatively changed. The
story of the strong poet’s self-reliance begins with his “anxiety of influence,” that is to
say with his “horror of finding himself to be only a copy or replica” (Bloom 80). The poet
fears that his most important creations do not really belong to him, but that they are the
results of unconscious impressions which a stronger, more radical and impressive poet
has left on his mind. Continually anxious about these impressions and their destructive
effects on his work, the strong poet has to decide that he wants to get rid of them and
that  he does  not  want  to be influenced by other poets.  He wants  to  create his  own
impressions and leave his own mark on the world. He desires to leave his impressions on
others and to redescribe the idiosyncracies of his individual self in a way that makes it
attractive to others.
34 The strong poet, fearing to be regarded as a mere copy or replica, eventually finds out
that by describing himself  in his own terms he creates himself.  Confronting his own
contingency,  acknowledging  and  appropriating  it,  is  synonymous  with  the  creative
invention of a new language or a new set of metaphors. Following Rorty, the final victory
of poetry in its ancient quarrel with philosophy might also be interpreted as the final
victory of idiosyncratic metaphors of self-creation over metaphors of discovery. Instead
of  the  will  to  truth  which  governed  a  philosophical  culture,  a  post-Philosophical  or
literary culture would be dominated by the Nietzschean will to self-overcoming and self-
creation. 
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3. James Baldwin and Pragmatism
35 Worldly Pragmatists and strong poets or liberal redescribers do not need (grand) theory.
Whereas West’s contention is that one ought to illuminate the necessity and possibility of
provisional, heuristic, tentative, and revisable theories, Rorty maintains that the idea of a
nominalist and historicist literary culture allows one to realize the utmost importance of
new vocabularies,  new sets of metaphors,  and creative and innovative redescriptions.
Both versions of neopragmatism reject abstract and totalizing theories. It is interesting to
see that, right at the beginning of his first volume of essays, Notes of a Native Son (1955),
Baldwin radically critiques the abstraction of theory and principles and confronts them
with the priority of practice (here: “the demands of life”): 
I think all theories are suspect, that the finest principles may have to be modified,
or  may  even  be  pulverized  by  the  demands  of  life,  and  that  one  must  find,
therefore, one own’s moral center and move through the world hoping that this
center will guide one aright (Baldwin, Notes of a Native Son 9).
36 Abstraction can only fail  since it  is  incapable of  grasping the complexity,  ambiguity,
irony, and paradox of black life in the U.S. Moreover, theory ought to be understood as
critique  in  the  sense  of  theoretical  practice.  This  kind  of  practice  longs  to  see  the
consequences of theory in history. One might feel tempted to advance the argument that
the quoted sentence does not imply a total rejection of theory and that Baldwin’s texts
rather  show that,  in  a  Jamesian  and  Westian  manner,  fallibilism,  tentativeness,  and
antiskepticism come together and urge one to revise one’s understanding of the task
theory has to fulfill.  However, at the same time, one should note that throughout his
essays Baldwin puts an emphasis on precisely that which escapes the grasp of theories,
abstractions, and principles: the singularity of all human experience, the particularity of
pain (the horrors of black life), the power of individual resistance, the fragmentary and
contingent character of human life, the possibilities of individual self-creation, human
finitude (the tragedy and reality of death), and individual moral commitment in the face
of uncertainty, absurdity, and paradox.
37 In a  manner that  reminds one of  William James’s  worldly pragmatism,  Baldwin calls
attention to “that dense, many-sided and shifting reality which is the world we live in and
the world we make” (Baldwin, Notes of a Native Son 44). Undoubtedly, Baldwin often
leaves his readers the impression that he is striving to penetrate through the veil  of
appearances, myths, misjudgments, and distorting prejudices to the really real or the
Truth.  In  other  words,  the  appearance-reality  distinction,  which  Rorty  has  been
criticizing since the 1970’s and which is central to metaphysical thought, often governs
Baldwin’s essays. Nonetheless, Baldwin’s aforementioned description of the world we live
in,  the world we make,  could also be used to characterize an antifoundationalist and
antiessentialist culture that no longer needs the certainty and reliability of what is more
than another human invention. Simply put, Baldwin is of course not a postmetaphysical
writer,  yet  he  often  prefers  making  to  finding  or discovering.  We  make  our  world,
constantly change and redescribe it in creative and innovative ways, and we also have to
embrace our responsibility, as far as the question of political and moral commitment is
concerned,  in  the  confrontation with  contingency and uncertainty.  Following Lawrie
Balfour, Baldwin’s essays reorient “the focus from the level of principle to the murky
region between principle and practice” (Balfour 20).  Balfour expands on this point as
follows: 
The dual conviction that principles cannot be conceived or elaborated apart from
human  experiences  and  that  those  experiences  repeatedly  undermine  the
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possibility that the principles will be realized lends an indispensable ambivalence
to Baldwin’s writing. The ferocity of his moralizing stems from an acute awareness
of the distance between principles and practice, and yet his appreciation of human
finitude  makes  him  suspicious  of  the  meanings  of  the  principles  themselves
(Balfour 17).
38 In  this  ‘murky  region  between  principle  and  practice,’  which  is  indeed  a  realm  of
‘ambivalence,’  and  the  realm  of  writing,  Baldwin  manages  to  radically  question
transcendence  and  metaphysics  without  being  able  to  leave  metaphysical  thinking
completely behind. Baldwin, it seems, needs the tension of the in-between, the interplay
of theory and practice, in order to sketch the possibility of establishing a new practice. In
this new practice, as he made notoriously clear in his essays on Richard Wright, it would
no longer be possible to make an abstraction of the individual black man or woman. I do
not intend to discuss Baldwin’s critique of Wright’s naturalism in detail here, yet some
aspects  of  this  critique  are  important  for  our  purposes.  Insisting  on  the  fact  that
“literature and sociology are not one and the same,” Baldwin argues that the protest
novel, far from disturbing American society, “is an accepted and comforting aspect of the
American scene, ramifying that framework we believe to be so necessary” (Baldwin, Notes
of a Native Son 19). Baldwin’s “Everybody’s Protest Novel” concentrates on Stowe’s Uncle
Tom’s Cabin,  but it  ends with a severe critique of Wright’s Native Son.  According to
Baldwin,  Wright’s  novel  does  not  pay  sufficient  attention  to  the  aforementioned
“demands  of  life.”  It  rejects  life  and  denies  the  complexity  and  ambiguity  of  black
existence. To put this somewhat differently, the Wrightian protest novel succumbs to the
temptation of simplifying abstractions and categorizations. As Baldwin writes, 
The failure of the protest novel lies in its rejection of life, the human being, the
denial of his beauty, dread, power, in its insistence that it is his categorization alone
which is real and which cannot be transcended” (Baldwin, Notes of a Native Son 23). 
39 Abstract categorizations, if one follows Baldwin’s line of argument, belong to the field of
sociology and its theoretical approaches; when applied to literature they can only lead to
stasis  and  the  depiction  of  one-dimensional  characters.  In  “Many  Thousands  Gone,”
Baldwin suggests that, in Native Son, a crucial dimension of black life has been completely
ignored or omitted. This dimension, as he underlines, is 
the relationship that Negroes bear to one another, that depth of involvement and
unspoken recognition of shared experience which creates a way of life. What the
novel reflects – and at no point interprets – is the isolation of the Negro within his
own group and the resulting fury of impatient scorn (Baldwin, Notes of a Native Son
35).
40 The climate of anarchy, fury, and violence thus created “has led us all to believe that in
Negro life there exists no tradition, no field of manners, no possibility of intercourse […]”
( Baldwin, Notes of a Native Son 35-6). Bigger appears as an utterly isolated and atomized
character without a past and without any kind of cultural tradition which he might use as
a source of strength and resistance. Furthermore, he is depicted as a young man who has
never been offered the possibility of grasping the meaning of racial solidarity and who
also seems to be without any kind of future possibility (the element of utopia). Hence,
Bigger appears as trapped in a static present, deprived of the possibility of change. In the
context of our argumentation, one might claim that what Baldwin primarily criticizes is
that Bigger is never given the possibility of creating a self. In the protest novel, in other
words, blacks are represented as helpless victims of white supremacy, giving in to the
enormous pressures of white society, and self-creation is a goal utterly out of reach. In
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confronting the complexity of  contingency,  the demands of  life,  and the potential  of
change, a black redescriber may develop new forms of self-creation and thereby sketch
new kinds of solidarity and innovative forms of resistance which may eventually lead to
future social change. This scenario, or so Baldwin seems to hold, is incompatible with the
depiction of black life in Wright’s Native Son.
41 Baldwin’s understanding of self-creation is another crucial aspect when one wishes to
demonstrate  his  significance  for  a  genealogy  of  black  pragmatism.  In  Irving  Howe’s
opinion, Baldwin “wanted to enter the world of freedom, grace, and self-creation” (Howe
134). Robert Penn Warren, in Who Speaks for the Negro?, points out: “What Baldwin has
most powerfully created is a self. That is his rare and difficult work of art” (Warren 297).
A discussion of Baldwin’s notion of self-creation inevitably leads to the antiessentialism of
his concept of identity. Identity, as Baldwin demonstrates, is not fixed, not accomplished,
not permanent, that is to say, it is to be understood as impure, transient, profoundly
unstable, and plural. In Baldwin’s texts there can be found many Nietzschean, Bloomian,
or Rortyan gestures of  self-creation,  and idiosyncratic  metaphors of  self-creation are
clearly  given  priority  over  metaphors  of  discovery  (here:  discovering  the  real  and
authentic self). As a self-reliant redescriber who desires self-creation, self-trust, and self-
overcoming, Baldwin must never accept somebody else’s description of himself. Longing
for self-creation and self-renewal,  and the creative invention of a new language, new
vocabularies, or a new set of metaphors, he vehemently underscores the particularity of
his independent black self and voice. He creates himself as a writer: 
Well,  I  had  said  that  I  was  going  to  be  a  writer,  God,  Satan,  and  Mississippi
notwithstanding, and that color did not matter, and that I was going to be free.
And,  here  I  was,  left  with  only  myself  to  deal  with.  It  was  entirely  up  to  me
(Baldwin, Nobody Knows My Name xiii). 
42 Like Rorty, Baldwin seems to hold that the U.S. is the ideal country for self-creation and
self-renewal. American society is not fixed, and this fact is especially attractive to writers:
American writers do not have a fixed society to describe.  The only society they
know is one in which nothing is fixed and in which the individual must fight for his
identity. This is a rich confusion, indeed, and it creates for the American writer
unprecedented opportunities (Baldwin, Nobody Knows My Name 11)
43 U.S. immigrants, in Baldwin’s account, had “to make themselves over in the image of
their new and unformed country” (Baldwin, Nobody Knows My Name 131). This creation
of a new self, in the confrontation with a new culture, was difficult insofar as there “were
no  longer  any  universally  accepted  forms  or  standards”  and  “all  the  roads  to  the
achievement of an identity had vanished” (Baldwin, Nobody Knows My Name 131). At the
end of “In Search of a Majority,” Baldwin argues that “[t]he one thing that all Americans
have in common is that they have no other identity apart from the identity which is being
achieved on this continent” (Baldwin,  Nobody Knows My Name 137).  While this  may
sound as coming dangerously close to another version of American exceptionalism, one
ought  to  see  that  Baldwin  considers  the  possibilities  of  (American)  self-creation  as
indispensable in the attempt to radically question American ideology, as well as American
myths.  Fighting white supremacy,  black self-creation creatively redescribes American
ideology. However, one might feel tempted to advance the argument that all this talk
about self-creation seems too playful, frivolous, and even cynical in view of the history of
blacks  in  the  U.S.  Black  self-creation  might  be  a  stimulating  endeavor  for  bookish
intellectuals, but the majority of blacks  have neither the time nor the money for such
attempts at self-renewal and self-overcoming. Baldwin is well aware of this problem. In
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No Name in the Street he stresses that the question of black self-creation is of an almost
existential nature. Following Baldwin, “to be born black in America is an immediate, a
mortal challenge” (Baldwin, No Name in the Street 114). Moreover, “a people under the
necessity of creating themselves must examine everything, and soak up learning the way
the roots of  a tree soak up water” (  Baldwin,  No Name in  the Street  114).  What this
signifies is that self-creation is a means of fighting white supremacy, it is a necessary part
of the black battle against discrimination and injustice. Blacks have to create themselves
in order not to perish. Questioning everything, from his own identity as a black and a gay
to the foundations and structures of American society, Baldwin was “free only in battle,
never free to rest” (Baldwin, No Name in the Street 112).
44 Throughout his texts, Baldwin calls attention to the fact that, as far as self-creation is
concerned, there are obvious limits for blacks. In “My Dungeon Shook,” a letter to his
nephew James, Baldwin explains to the teenager that white society has set limits to his
ambition, that is, it will be very difficult for this young black to create himself in view of
various obstacles: 
You were born where you were born and faced the future that you faced because
you were black and for no other reason.  The limits of your ambition were, thus,
expected to be set forever. You were born into a society which spelled out with
brutal clarity, and in as many ways as possible, that you were a worthless human
being (Baldwin, The Fire Next Time 7).
45 A visit to the ghetto of Chicago’s South Side leads Baldwin to the following reflection: 
Here was the South Side – a million in captivity – stretching from this doorstep as
far as the eye could see. And they didn’t even read; depressed populations don’t
have the time or energy to spare ( Baldwin, The Fire Next Time 61). 
46 What all  this boils  down to is  that the question of self-creation in Baldwin does not
necessarily have to be seen in connection with the advantages of an antifoundationalist
and antiessentialist  literary  or  poeticized  culture.  Rather,  Baldwinian self-creation  is
primarily part of a political endeavor, a cultural criticism which critiques U.S. society and
white  supremacy  and  which,  in  a  Westian  manner,  eventually  leads  to  moral
responsibility and commitment in the face of contingency, absurdity, and tragedy. In his
conversation  with  Margaret  Mead,  Baldwin  states  that  he  considers  people  “to  be
responsible, moral creatures who so often do not act that way. But I am not surprised
when they do” (Mead 143).
47 Seeking to become “a truly moral human being,” Baldwin contends that white people who
rob blacks of their rights and their liberty have “no moral ground on which to stand”
( Baldwin, The Fire Next Time 47, 23). This last metaphor is somewhat misleading, as
Baldwin in general does not favor the idea of a common ground in the form of a shared
human attribute. To put it differently, he does not think that there is something like an
ahistorical  nature  which  unites  us  human  beings,  and  that  the  existence  of  this
ahistorical nature as our real core forces us to recognize the importance of our steadily
increasing moral knowledge and thus calls attention to the fundamental nature of firm
moral principles. In contrast to foundationalists and metaphysicians, Baldwin does not
hold that we are morally lost without the acceptance of the idea that deep down inside us
there is something which unites us as human beings, a kind of ahistorical, transcultural,
and noncontingent core, and he moreover critiques the notion that we need a moral
reference point and that in order to achieve moral progress we need moral principles.
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48 I have already mentioned Baldwin’s antiessentialism as far as the concept of identity is
concerned. In Ross Posnock’s discussion of Baldwin, this antiessentialism plays a crucial
role.  One  of  Posnock’s  primary  concerns  in  Color  &  Culture is  to  illuminate  the
importance  of  pragmatism  for  the  careers  of  twentieth-century  black  intellectuals,
specifically W.E.B. Du Bois and Alain Locke. Du Bois and Locke, as Posnock submits, were
profoundly influenced by William James’s pragmatist pluralism, by his openness to the
excluded  and  marginalized,  and  by  his  critique  of traditional  notions  of  identity.
Regarding  Locke’s  understanding  of  identity,  for  instance,  Posnock  writes:  “In
emphasizing the primacy of use rather than identity, Locke makes the pragmatist move
that conceives identity not as antecedent essence but as an effect of action” (Posnock
11-12). Situating Baldwin within what he terms “the miscegenated lineage of pragmatist
pluralism”  (Posnock  223),  Posnock  argues  that  Baldwin  strove  to  substitute  a
cosmopolitan nationalism for a racial essentialism. Posnock reads Baldwin as a “prophet
of post-ethnicity” (Posnock 224) who demonstrated that black and white were obsolete
and useless terms and who desired to contribute to the creation of a color-blind society.
Baldwin’s “dialectical cosmopolitanism” or “maverick cosmopolitanism” (Posnock 226,
235) was strongly opposed to ideologies of authenticity and purity and instead favored
impurity,  intermixture,  miscegenation,  creative  invention,  deracination,  and  the
dispersal of identity. According to Posnock, Baldwin had to confront 
the task faced by all pragmatist pluralists – turning identity from an accomplished
fact that excludes and forecloses to a continuing practice of skepticism (Posnock
227). 
49 Posnock  is  right  in  underlining  that  Baldwin  often  criticized  America  for  being
insufficiently motley, not plural and heterogeneous enough. America had not yet used its
potential for otherness to a satisfying degree.  Baldwin’s self-creation wanted to draw
attention to the complexity of this potential, and at the same time he intended for others
to realize the possibility of  creative self-renewal and self-overcoming for themselves.
Baldwinian self-creation is described as follows by Posnock: 
Baldwin performs an act of flagrant artifice, as he blends black and white, Europe
and America, high and popular culture, into an assemblage designed to catalyze his
artistic birth. The “specialness” that emerges – the creation called James Baldwin –
embodies what he calls “enormous incoherence” and Henry James calls a “hotch-
potch.” Which is to say he is utterly American (Posnock 237).
50 For our purposes,  it  is  important to see that Baldwin’s desire for political  and social
change became more intense and explicit in his later texts. Especially in No Name in the
Street, this reorientation becomes obvious. Influenced by Malcom X and later on by the
Black Panthers around Huey Newton, Baldwin presents himself as a black socialist writer
and partly even as a black radical and revolutionary who seeks to justify the use of arms
in the fight for black freedom (cf. Baldwin, No Name in the Street 163-64). The intensity of
Baldwin’s proposals in the early 1970’s reminds one of Cornel West in the 1980’s, when he
developed  his  own  brand  of  democratic  socialism which  reactivated  the  heritage  of
American pragmatism, drew on the resources of black liberation theology, and which at
the  same time  put  a  stress  on  the  indispensability  yet  insufficiency  of  Marxism.  As
regards the question of socialism in the U.S., Baldwin states: 
Huey believes, and I do, too, in the necessity of establishing a form of socialism in
this  country  –  what  Bobby  Seale  would  probably  call  a  ‘Yankee  Doodle  type’
socialism. This means an indigenous socialism, formed by, and responding to, the
real needs of the American people (Baldwin, No Name in the Street 150). 
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51 He justifies  his  decision  to  call  for  the  establishment  of  an  indigenous  socialism by
directing attention to a broader context: 
The necessity for a form of socialism is based on the observation that the world’s
present economic arrangements doom most of the world to misery; that the way of
life dictated by these arrangements is both sterile and immoral; and, finally, that
there is no hope for peace in the world so long as these arrangements obtain (
Baldwin, No Name in the Street 150).
52 Baldwin  makes  it  unequivocally  clear  that  he  is  not  talking  about  liberal  piecemeal
reform here, but rather about radical political and social change. A real commitment to
black freedom in the U.S., as he maintains, “would have the effect of re-ordering all our
priorities,  and  altering  all  our  commitments”  (Baldwin,  No Name  in  the  Street 153).
Speaking “out of the most passionate love” ( Baldwin, No Name in the Street 166) for the
U.S., and never faltering in the attempt to achieve his country, Baldwin throughout his
career demonstrated that his idiosyncratic self-creation and the fate of his native country
were inextricably entwined.
4. Conclusion
53 In my discussion of James Baldwin’s essays, I have focused on three aspects. First, I have
analyzed his understanding of theory, abstraction, and principles. Second, I have sought
to elucidate the role self-creation, morality, and the concept of identity play in his texts.
Finally, the question of political and social or cultural change has been of primary
concern to me. It was argued that, to a certain extent, Baldwin could be considered part
of a genealogy of black pragmatism as pluralism. The combination of pragmatist ideas
that is  characteristic  of  his  work allows one to situate it  between Cornel  West’s  and
Richard Rorty’s versions of pragmatism. It would undoubtedly be pointless to claim that
Baldwin is a radically postmetaphysical author and thus an ideal member of a pragmatist
literary or poeticized culture. Yet his politicized version of self-creation makes it seem
legitimate to advance the idea that one can regard him as part of a left-liberal tradition of
worldly pragmatism that sees the work of  the strong poet or creative redescriber as
contributing to political and social change. 
54 If there is a characteristic that unites pragmatists as varied as James, Dewey, Rorty, and
West, apart from their critique of Platonist and Kantian epistemology, it is their strong
emphasis upon the democratic potential of America (see Westbrook). The significance of
pragmatism cannot be adequately grasped without considering the gesture of holding on
to this democratic potential. It can be said that pragmatism accentuates and strives to
expand democratic possibilities in the U.S. In his latest book, Democracy Matters, West
illustrates the importance of Baldwin’s thinking in this context. Following West, Baldwin
was “the most fully Emersonian of democratic intellectuals” (West, Democracy Matters
78) in U.S. history. Furthermore, Baldwin’s “artistic eloquence, dramatic insights,  and
prophetic fire put him at the center of democracy matters for over thirty years” ( West,
Democracy Matters 79). It is crucial to note that West avers that in Baldwin’s account it is
the conception of democracy developed by blacks that is the best means of confronting
the crisis of moral decay in the U.S. Baldwin offers a hitherto neglected perspective from
which to analyze the current dilemma: 
Baldwin contends that the crisis of the moral decay of the American empire is best
met  by  turning  to  the  democratic  determination  of  black  people  –  looking  at
America’s democratic limits through the lens of race in order to renew and relive
deep democratic energies (West, Democracy Matters 85). 
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55 While Baldwin was certainly not the first writer who used the ‘lens of race’ in order to
analyze and eventually strengthen the deep democratic tradition in the U.S., his texts are
still suggestive and stimulating since they illuminate the creative and political potential
of a combination of three things: pragmatism as pluralism, the notion of democracy, and
the category of race. A political and worldly strong poet or creative redescriber, Baldwin
was a determined fighter for black freedom and autonomy, and at the same time his
version  of  cultural  criticism  might  be  used  to  help  prepare  the  establishment  of  a
postmetaphysical literary or poeticized culture, a kind of culture, that is, in which man
finally realizes that he or she no longer needs the certainty and reliability of what is more
than another human invention. Baldwin, one may insinuate, would have liked this idea of
a poeticized culture.
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ABSTRACTS
This article seeks to contribute to a discussion of pragmatism’s political impulses. It concentrates
on the hitherto somewhat neglected question of pragmatism and race. In order to elucidate one
possibility of approaching this complex question, the article discusses James Baldwin’s essays. It
is argued that Baldwin’s essays can be used to show the significance of a middle ground between
Cornel  West’s  prophetic  pragmatism  and Richard  Rorty’s  liberal  version  of  neopragmatism.
While the first part analyzes West’s prophetic and worldly pragmatism, the second part seeks to
illuminate  Rorty’s  notion  of  a  pragmatist  literary  or  poeticized  culture.  The  final  part
demonstrates  that  while  it  would  be  pointless  to  claim  that  Baldwin  is  a  radically
postmetaphysical author and thus an ideal member of a literary culture, his politicized version of
self-creation makes it seem legitimate to advance the argument that he is part of a left-liberal
tradition of worldly pragmatism that sees the work of the strong poet or creative redescriber as
contributing to political and social change.
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